election would not be conducted in accordance with international democratic standards. They call this "fake universal suffrage", and they argue that China must grant Hong Kong "genuine universal suffrage". Under the Basic Law, any constitutional reform such as the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage can only be introduced by a two-thirds majority in the Hong Kong legislature, in which the "pro-democracy" political parties occupy more than one-third of the seats.
The struggle for the realization of universal suffrage in the election of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong in 2017 provides a good case study of constitutional politics in a sub-national political community exercising autonomy and seeking to introduce constitutional reform and democratization. It is also particularly interesting because Hong Kong is an SAR of China, the major Communist Party-ruled polity in the contemporary world, while the aspirations of Hong Kong's democracy movement are towards Western-style liberal constitutional democracy. This paper seeks to tell this story of Hong Kong's quest for democratization, focusing particularly on the law and politics of Hong Kong's constitutional reform. It suggests that whether such constitutional reform will occur or not is unpredictable at present, and that the success or failure of the constitutional reform depends crucially on Beijing's policy towards the pro-democracy political parties in Hong Kong. This paper consists of the following parts. Part I examines the constitutional and legal provisions governing Hong Kong's political system and its development. Part II reviews briefly the movements towards democratization that have taken place since the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 1997. Part III consider developments since early 2013, when a social movement known as the "Occupy Central" campaign developed to struggle for the realization of genuine universal suffrage in the election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. The paper will focus particularly on the positions of the democracy activists in Hong Kong, as well as the stance of the Central Government in Beijing. Finally, Part IV will conclude by evaluating the prospects for Hong Kong's democratization.
I Hong Kong's Political System: Constitutional and Legal Provisions
The British Empire acquired the colony of Hong Kong -the geographical territory of which is now the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) -from China in three stages: the cession of Hong Kong Island by the Qing Emperor in China to Britain in 1842 after the "Opium War"; the cession of Kowloon Peninsula (to the north of Hong Kong Island) by the system was described as "administrative absorption of politics" or "government by it also sets out the social and economic policies and systems to be practiced in the HKSAR.
As regards Hong Kong's political system, the Joint Declaration had only provided for it briefly, while the Basic Law provides for the details. One of the main areas of controversy during the drafting of the Basic Law was the extent to which the political system of the HKSAR should be democratic, given that the colonial political system at the time the Joint Declaration was signed in 1984 was hardly democratic in that neither the executive nor the legislature was elected by the people of Hong Kong.
The Joint Declaration did contemplate some degree of democratization of this colonial political system. On the mode of selection of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR -who would replace the colonial Governor as the head of the Hong Kong government, the Joint Declaration provided that the Chief Executive "shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government". As regards the legislature, which was an entirely appointed body at the time of the Joint Declaration, the Joint Declaration provided that the HKSAR legislature "shall be constituted by elections", but did not elaborate further on the precise mode of election. As regards the relationship between the executive and the legislature, the Joint Declaration provided that the executive "shall be accountable to the legislature".
The provisions of the Basic Law regarding the design of the political system of the HKSAR may be summarized as follows. The Basic Law declares that the "ultimate aim" 5 of the political evolution of Hong Kong is the election of both the Chief
Executive and all members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) by universal suffrage.
However, it is also provided that such political evolution depends on "the actual situation in the HKSAR" and "the principle of gradual and orderly progress". 6 The
Basic Law itself provides for a progressive increase in the number of directly elected members (i.e. members elected by universal suffrage in geographical constituencies in different parts of Hong Kong, as distinguished by members elected by "functional constituencies" to be discussed below) of LegCo from 20 (out of a total membership of 60) in the first LegCo to 24 in the second LegCo, and then to 30 in the third LegCo. 7 As regards the selection of the Chief Executive, it is provided that the first Chief Executive would be chosen by a Selection Committee of 400 members, and the second and third
Chief Executives elected by an Election Committee of 800 members. Given that the Joint Declaration provided that the Chief Executive may be chosen either by election or consultation, and did not make it clear that the elections to the Legislature must be direct election rather indirect election or election by "functional constituencies", the gains for democracy in the making of the Basic Law may be recognised.
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An important feature of the political system prescribed by the Basic Law is that it is not a static one but an evolving one, and the logic and mechanism of its evolution is provided for in the Basic Law itself. The ultimate aim of universal suffrage, the principle of gradual and orderly progress and the phased increase in the number of directly elected legislators have been mentioned above. the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC).
The Basic Law, though enacted already in 1990, would only come fully into effect in 1997 upon the establishment of the HKSAR. In the "transition period" between 1984 (the year the Joint Declaration was signed) and 1997, the British colonial government continued to govern Hong Kong. It introduced a series of measures for Hong Kong's democratization in preparation for the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Some of these measures were contested by the PRC, which argued that constitutional reforms in Hong Kong during the transition period must "converge" with the model of the HKSAR political system prescribed by the Basic Law. However, Beijing did not object to all of the political reforms introduced by the colonial government. Actually, some of the political institutions created by the colonial government in the transition period were recognized by and incorporated into the Basic Law itself. The most important of such institutions was that of "functional constituencies", the origins of which will now be elaborated.
In 1985, the colonial government introduced its first major measure towards Hong Kong's democratization. This was the creation of 24 elected seats in the LegCo (see Appendix I of this paper for the total number of seats, the modes of election and their subsequent changes). Twelve of these seats were elected by electoral colleges comprising the District Boards, the Urban Council and Regional Council, which were largely consultative bodies at local levels. The other twelve were elected by "functional constituencies" consisting of business and professional groupings, such as chambers of commerce, industrialists' federations, trade unions and members of professions such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and teachers. The original logic of functional constituencies as explained by the colonial government was that they represented sectors of society from which appointed unofficial members of LegCo were formerly drawn, and in the course of democratization, it was appropriate that the corporate bodies or individual members of these sectors would elect their own representatives into LegCo. These two Subject to these parameters, the electoral arrangements for the CE and LegCo in 2012 may be amended in accordance with the "principle of gradual and orderly progress" as provided for in the Basic Law. Basic Law and the NPCSC Interpretation of 6 April 2004 should be followed: (1) the CE making a report to the NPCSC, (2) the NPCSC rendering a decision thereon, (3) a Government bill for electoral reform being passed by a two-thirds majority in LegCo, (4) the CE consenting to the bill, and (5) the bill being reported to the NPCSC for approval or for the record.
(d) At its meeting the NPCSC was "of the view that" the nominating committee (referred to in the Basic Law) for candidates for election of the CE by universal suffrage "may be formed with reference to the current provisions regarding the Election Committee in Annex I to the Hong Kong Basic Law". 21 The nominating committee shall in accordance with democratic procedures 22 "nominate a certain number of candidates for the office of the CE, who is to be elected through universal suffrage by all registered electors of the HKSAR, and to be appointed by the Central People's Government". Committee. There were however two main differences between the two proposals. proposed by the HKSAR Government --must win the support of a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council before the reform can go ahead. Thus whether a particular reform will materialize depends on the collective will of the Central Government, the HKSAR Government and the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo). In the LegCo, the pan-democrats (who on the average secured approximately 60% of the popular votes for the half of LegCo seats that were elected by universal suffrage) have always secured more than one-third of the seats in LegCo;
thus they have the power of veto on any political reform. In 2005, they vetoed the political reform package proposed by the government on the ground that it was not democratic enough. In 2010, the government's proposal would have been vetoedagain on the ground that it was not democratic enough -but for a last-minute major amendment of the proposal.
Thus the paradox of the constitutional dynamics of Hong Kong's democratization is that the pan-democrats have the voting power to defeat any government proposal for democratization which they consider to be not democratic enough and thus unsatisfactory, even though the pan-democrats do not themselves have the power to initiate any democratic reform or to secure its passage in LegCo.
Given the provisions on democratization in the Basic Law and the demands for democratization from civil society in Hong Kong, the central government and the Hong Kong government have been willing to introduce moderate measures in the direction of democratization. The pan-democrats, in reliance on their power of veto, may seek to bargain for a better deal. However, whether they succeed or not depends on whether there is a sufficient incentive and will on the part of the central government and the Hong Kong government to make a deal and to move Hong Kong forward on the path of democratization. In case the bargaining fails and no deal is reached, there would be no forward movement at all and the status quo of the political system would be maintained. In this case, both the pan-democrats and the government would be losers, assuming that the interests of both the pan-democrats and the government would be served by a movement towards democratization.
III The Struggle for "Genuine" Universal Suffrage Since Early 2013
To the pan-democrats, the political reform of 2010 was only of limited significance, since Hong Kong's political system is still far away from achieving the goals of what they call "double universal suffrage" -the election of the Chief Executive and of all members of LegCo by universal suffrage. As mentioned above, the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) had in December 2007 set the timetable for the realization of these goals: the Chief Executive may be elected by universal suffrage in 2017, and thereafter the whole of the LegCo may also be so elected.
Mr Donald Tsang, Chief Executive at the time, described this NPCSC Decision as "a most important step for Hong Kong's constitutional development". 29 The setting of the "timetable" for further democratization in Hong Kong was indeed a significant
development. Yet it should be noted that some of the most controversial issues regarding Hong Kong's political development have remained unresolved. In particular, Central government officials have also pointed out that nominations by the NC are "institutional nominations" (i.e. nominations by the NC as an institution) expressing the "collective will" of the committee, which are different in nature from the procedure of joint nominations by individuals used by the existing Election Committee for the election of the Chief Executive. It has also been stressed that the Chief Executive must be a "patriot" who "loves the nation and loves Hong Kong", and the Central Government will not appoint as Chief Executive someone who is "confrontational" towards the Central Government and attempts to change the socialist political system in mainland China. In March 2014, Mr Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the NPCSC, said that the design of the model for universal suffrage for the Chief Executive of the HKSAR is a matter that concerns the "sovereignty, security and developmental interests" of the PRC, and that the context for the universal suffrage to be practiced in the HKSAR is that of a local election and not a national election -hence the models for national elections in other countries are not necessarily appropriate for Hong Kong. Subsequently, it was elaborated that if someone who is not a "patriot" becomes the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, the security interests of the PRC might be prejudiced.
The key difference between Beijing's position on universal suffrage for Hong Kong's Chief Executive and that of the pan-democrats seems to be as follows. Beijing would like to ensure that the candidates for election by universal suffrage to the office of the Chief Executive are all acceptable, trustworthy and appointable from Beijing's point of view, in the sense that they are not "confrontational" towards the Central Government or ideologically opposed to the "socialist political system" being practiced in mainland China. The system of nominations of candidates by a nominating committee as provided for in Article 45 of the Basic Law enables this objective to be achieved if the majority of the members of the nominating committee are "pro-China" or "patriots". Thus it was suggested in the 2007 Decision of the NPCSC that the composition of the nominating committee may be based on that of the existing election committee for the Chief Executive. The political reality has been that with the 4-sector composition of the election committee and its members being largely elected by functional constituencies, the majority of its members are indeed "pro-China", and those who are pan-democrats or sympathetic to them only constitute a minority in the election committee.
On the other hand, the pan-democrats are firmly opposed to any "screening" to be performed by the nominating committee for the purpose of preventing persons who have considerable public support among Hong Kong voters (such as leading members of the pan-democrats) but are not "patriots" in Beijing's eyes from becoming candidates for election by universal suffrage to the office of the Chief Executive. In their view, this would be "fake" universal suffrage and inconsistent with international standards of democracy which prohibit unreasonable restrictions on the right to be a candidate in an election (such as restrictions or discrimination based on a person's political opinion). "Genuine" universal suffrage, in their view, requires a truly competitive election in which candidates with different platforms and political opinions may freely and fairly compete for votes. Given that the pan-democrats have always obtained a majority of the popular votes for the half of the LegCo seats that were elected by universal suffrage (the other half being elected by functional constituencies), they believe that any nomination system for the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage which makes it impossible for their leaders to be nominated as candidates would not be genuine universal suffrage.
The above-mentioned difference between Beijing and the pan-democrats in Hong Kong on the issue of universal suffrage can only be fully understood in the light of history and orientation of the "pan-democrats" or "pro-democracy" politicians as a political force in Hong Kong, to which we now turn. Since the 1980s and until now, politicians and activists in Hong Kong have been divided into two camps-the pro-China camp (now commonly known as the "pro-establishment" camp) and the pro-democracy camp (now commonly known as the "pan-democrats"). 31 The division has been intensified by the experience of various major political events, such as the Beijing student movement in 1989, the political reform introduced by Governor
Chris Patten in the 1990s (which was opposed by Beijing but supported by the pan-democrats), the establishment of the Provisional Legislative Council at the time of the 1997 handover (which was opposed by the pan-democrats), the "right of abode" litigation leading to the first-ever interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPCSC In each of these events, the pan-democrats opposed the Chinese Government's position. The pan-democrats or "pro-democracy" camp has been labelled "the opposition camp" by some pro-China commentators in Hong Kong. per cent of the popular votes for that portion of LegCo seats which were filled by elections by universal suffrage. 33 The Chinese Government's concern is therefore that if unrestricted elections by universal suffrage were introduced in Hong Kong, the office of the Chief Executive and the majority of LegCo seats would be captured by the pan-democrats.
There seems to exist a fundamental difference in the understanding of "autonomy" and of the relationship between "autonomy" and "democracy" on the part of the Chinese Government on the one hand and the pro-democracy political parties, Beijing's understanding of the autonomy of the HKSAR is however not the same.
It has always been stressed that the power of appointment of the Chief Executive is a substantive power and not merely formal or ceremonial. This is to ensure that the Chief 33 The pro-China camp has consistently captured 30-40% of these popular votes.
2017.

IV Conclusion
The realization of the election of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR by universal suffrage in 2017 will be no easy task. If politics is the art of the possible, the project of realizing such universal suffrage would be a supreme test of the skills, acumen, courage and wisdom of Hong Kong politicians in practising this art. Would it be possible to devise a model for the Chief Executive election which both recognizes the democratic aspirations of the pan-democrats and preserves the prerogatives of the Central Government in ensuring that the Chief Executive of the HKSAR will not be someone confrontational towards the Central Government? Would Beijing ultimately agree to a nominating system with a relatively low "nomination threshold" so that pan-democrats may put forward their candidate(s) for the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage? Would the pan-democrats, or at least some of them, accept an electoral model which falls short of their present demands, so that the model secures the requisite two-thirds majority in LegCo? The answers to these questions will be known in the coming year.
My own assessment of the situation is as follows. Although the pan-democrats have pushed strongly for civic nominations so as to bypass the nominating committee which is likely to be dominated by "pro-China" forces, civic nominations will in all likelihood be rejected by the Hong Kong and Beijing governments as being inconsistent with Article 45 of the Basic Law. It is likely that the government will put forward a model for electing the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in which the nominating committee would be constituted in a manner similar to the existing election committee for electing the Chief Executive, but democratized by expanding the electoral base of voters (at present approximately 200,000 persons) for the committee and the number of members of the committee. The key issue in the institutional design of the nomination system would be the "nomination threshold", i.e. how many members of the nominating committee need to vote for a particular person in order for this person to become a candidate for election by universal suffrage. The more democratic is the manner of constituting the nominating committee and the lower the nomination threshold, the greater is the chance that at least some of the pan-democrats may be persuaded to support the proposal so that it can be passed by a two-thirds majority in LegCo.
In the final analysis, whether Beijing will agree to an electoral model that is acceptable to the pan-democrats and that can be passed by LegCo is likely to depend on a cost-and-benefit analysis of introducing elections of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The benefit would be to be seen to honour the promise made in the 2007 Decision of the NPCSC and in the Basic Law, and to win the support of Hong Kong people who aspire towards democracy. Furthermore, some believe that the Hong Kong Government will become more effective if its Chief Executive is elected by universal suffrage and thus has greater legitimacy to govern Hong Kong. On the other hand, an electoral model that is acceptable to the pan-democrats would be one in which the pan-democrats would have a reasonable chance of getting their candidate(s) being nominated by the nominating committee as candidate(s) in the Chief Executive election by universal suffrage. For Beijing, agreeing to such an electoral model means to accept that there is a chance that a pan-democrat would be the winner in the election. Beijing will have to assess the likelihood of this scenario materializing, and to consider how to deal with this scenario should it materialize. Would it appoint the pan-democrat as Chief Executive?
Or would it decline to make an appointment -a power which it has under the Basic Law, so that another election should be held? What would be the nature and 
